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THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH AND
THE SUPREME COURT
James Willard Hurst*
Statutory law is both central and basic to the legal order in the
United States. It has been so since we became a nation, though
through most of the nineteenth century the fact was obscured by the
growth of common law in default of legislative action over large
areas of private relationships. The importance of legislation was ordained in the distinctive array of powers which constitutions put in
the legislative branch-authority to determine standards and rules
of conduct in any area of social life legislators found to be of public
interest, to allocate economic resources by taxing, borrowing, and
spending, to create or legitimize forms of public and private organization for collective effort, and to investigate matters of fact which
legislators decided might be relevant to general welfare. The
growth of statutory law mounted steadily during the twentieth century. Between the 1920s and 1980s legislation developed providing
standards and rules for major sectors of life-for the market (as in
the law of commercial instruments and creditors' rights, of corporations, and of fair trade practices), for important non-market areas
(as in public policy concern for the physical and biological environment), and for key constituent institutions (as in law affecting public
and private welfare organizations, the family, and public and private educational facilities). Moreover, twentieth century statutory
law legitimizes and structures the range of executive and administrative rules which have come to bulk large in many fields, including
regulation of public utilities, corporate securities, and marketing of
food and drugs. In this perspective common law and inherent executive prerogative powers appear as relatively limited parts of twentieth century legal order.
This sweep of legislative development has gone on within a
constitutional tradition. Constitutional grants and limitations have
provided the frame for legislative action, setting basic legislative
structure and marking the outer bounds of legislative jurisdiction.
Enforcement of constitutional grants and limitations has presented
* Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School.
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its own problems. To some extent general political processes have
implemented the constitutional ideal. Legislators and chief executives, like judges, swear oaths to support constitutions. Appeals to
constitutional principles and provisions have figured from time to
time in legislative debate and decision. Most of the time, however,
legislatures have shown more by their practice than by their speech
the terms in which they have interpreted their authority. Thus,
through the nineteenth century the extent of Congress's spending
power emerged more from the facts of Congressional appropriations
than from Congressional explanation. The constitutional ideal has
been a living part of the country's political tradition, so that campaigners have been able to appeal to the voters in constitutional
symbols. Usually, however, politics center on more specific issues.
General political processes-whether in legislatures or at the pollshave thus left a distinctive role in enforcing constitutional principles
and provisions to judicial review of the legality of official action.
English common law tradition provided judicial review of what executive or administrative officers did. Our history developed the
new element of judicial review of legislative determinations of public policy.
Judicial review developed as a distinctive institution, inherently
presenting dramas of confrontation, thus encouraging exaggeration
of its relative importance. We should put it in proper perspective in
relation to the general weight of statutory law in the legal order.
Measured against the whole range and density of legislative product, relatively little legislation has ever been reviewed by the judiciary, let alone been ruled invalid. The overwhelming bulk of the
courts' work with statutes has concerned only their interpretation
and application, not their validity. Courts have not been presented
with constitutional challenges to most everyday affairs carried on
under statutes laying taxes, providing public services, prescribing
behavior for business firms, or protecting the welfare of workers,
consumers, or the general public. On most matters legislative practice and judgment rather than court orders have determined the uses
made of legislative authority.
There is inherent tension between the roles of the legislature
and the court under the constitutional ideal. Normally elected, representative assemblies are the principal agencies to determine general public policy. This is done, however, within grants and
limitations contained in constitutions. Tension is inescapable between constitutional provisions providing a frame of authority for
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the long term, and legislative response to ongoing needs, wants, and
changing social circumstances. Variety and change in social experience mean that no definitive code can finally resolve this strain. The
system has worked only by developing and observing some procedures of comity among those who hold different roles in making
public policy, but who share responsibility for respecting the constitutional frame.
I pass by the long, in some respects still hotly debated question,
whether judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes is legitimate within our tradition of constitutional, republican government.
Accepting judicial review as a material element of the working legal
order, I inquire here only how legislators and judges have gone
about trying to make it work in the twentieth century. Even within
that limited definition of the subject, however, the issue of legitimacy of judicial review does not disappear. Among public policy
makers, unease persists about the relation of judicial review to the
proper role of legislatures. This unease has found expression in special procedures and limiting doctrines for judges in handling issues
of the interpretation and constitutionality of statutes, and in the relevance of such judge-made doctrines to the definition and implementation of legislative authority.
THE TITLE OF THE LEGISLATURE
A court has the potential for most drastically affecting the status of the legislative branch when it entertains questions about the
legitimacy of the other body as a law maker on any subject. Our
system demands that the legislative body be fairly representative of
the electorate, that its members be duly elected, and that they act as
trustees of public interest. In all these respects judicial review has
been quite limited, and with one important exception, twentieth
century developments have continued that limited character.
Many factors-the distribution of wealth and income, religious,
social, and ethnic loyalties, available lines of communication-affect the representative quality of elected assemblies. Formal structure enters in, fundamentally in provisions for determining who
may vote and defining the districts from which elected representatives shall come. Constitution makers provided the basis for establishing the electorate, most decisively in the fourteenth amendment.
But in the twentieth century, Congress and the Supreme Court-
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notably in the Voting Rights Act of 1965' and in decisions which
translated constitutional standards of equal protection into detailed
bans on racial or wealth criteria for access to the vote 2-added substantially to constitutional principle. The federal constitution left to
the states the definition of districts for elections to Congress and to
state legislatures. State constitutions commonly set standards intended to assure political fairness in districting, if not in apportionment of voters among districts. Nineteenth century state court
decisions enforced such state standards against gerrymanderingarrangement of district lines calculated to give gross advantage to
one political party over another.3 The fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause held the potential for federal court review of
state districting and apportionment schemes. In 1946, however, the
Supreme Court appeared to bar fourteenth amendment challenges
to the apportionment of voters among legislative districts as raising4
issues suitable only for disposition through political processes.
Baker v. Carr5 removed that barrier, holding that malapportionment presented a justiciable claim under the equal protection standard. The decision stands as a major influence on relations between
the legislative and judicial branches in our time. It has had a sharp
impact on the structuring of congressional districts, since the Court
applied its most strict scrutiny, refusing to accept any but minor variations in the voter population of these districts. The Justices have,
however, underlined the extent of discretion they assert in this domain by applying a less severe test to apportionment of state legislatures. Though the equal protection standard still governs there, in
recognition of proper regard for local government and community
interests, the Court allows a state legislature a wider degree of variation in voter populations of state legislative districts than it will accept in congressional districts.6
In one important respect state and federal court decisions put
1. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to

1973bb-1 (1976)).
2. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (racial discrimination in voting); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax).
3. E.g., State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 53 N.W. 35 (1892); State ex rel.
Attorney General v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 (1892); see Stevens v. Faubus,
234 Ark. 826, 830, 354 S.W.2d 707, 710 (1962) (mere maintenance of status quo does not

meet constitutional apportionment standard).
4. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
5. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
6. Compare Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578, reh'g denied, 379 U.S. 870 (1954).
Compare Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (congressional districts) with Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315, mod#ied, 411 U.S. 922 (1973) (state legislative districts).
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an absolute limit on judicial enforcement of constitutional standards
for legislative districting and apportionment. Litigants have standing to challenge the validity of such legislation by direct attack, that
is, by asking a court to enjoin application of the districting or apportionment act itself. But they may not obtain a ruling on the validity
of such a statute by collateral attack, that is, by asking a court to
deny legal effect to other laws passed by a legislature on the ground
that the legislature was malapportioned or wrongly districted. Logic
might suggest a different outcome. Gerrymandered districting or
grossly unequal allocation of voters among districts violates the basic criterion of representative character which legitimizes a legislative body; if that basis of legitimacy is lacking, the body has no title
to legislate at all. However, this logic runs into separation of powers
values which persistently bring into issue the legitimate extent of
judicial review itself, questioning how far a small body of judgesmany appointed rather than elected-are entitled to go in setting
aside the actions of the other branches of the legal system. Moreover, the invalidation of all products of an allegedly malapportioned
or wrongly districted legislature would inject profound uncertainty
into the condition of the general legal order. Not surprisingly,
courts have ruled that once a legislature sits, its output may not be
challenged on the ground that the body was wrongly constituted.
State courts had earlier ruled so under state constitutional provisions; in the aftermath of Baker v. Carr, federal decisions put the
same barrier on invoking the fourteenth amendment.7
The political legitimacy of a legislative body rests also on
proper election of its members. This is an area in which the courts,
including the Supreme Court of the United States, have not attempted to intervene directly. Their abstention rests, in the first instance, on the provisions of the national and state constitutions
which explicitly allocate to each legislative chamber the judging of
the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members. Courts
also refuse to upset legislation on the ground of alleged improprieties in election of members of the legislature; the concern not to unsettle the reliance people may reasonably put on the statute books
has operated here as in the apportionment problem to fix an abso7. Dawson v. Bomar, 322 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 933 (1964);
Ryan v. Tinsley, 316 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 17 (1963); State ex rel.
Attorney General v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 470, 483, 516, 531, 51 N.W. 724, 729, 740,
745 (1892). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142 (1976).
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lute limit on judicial review.8 The strength of the tradition of judicial review has shown itself even in this domain. In Powell v.
McCormack9 the Supreme Court ruled that criteria of "qgalifications" for membership are limited to those declared in the constitution-age, citizenship, and residence. The Court would not accord
validity to the action of Congress whereby Congress excluded a
member based on criteria outside the constitutional catalog.' 0 Nevertheless, nothing in Powell v. McCormack warrants judicial review
of the regularity of an election of a candidate under the constitutionally declared tests.
Legislators are to act as trustees for the public interest. If they
violate their trust by acting to serve private interest, arguably courts
should stand ready to deny legal effect to their faithless actions.
Breach of trust, being hard to prove, is likely to occur under the
guise of seeming propriety." If breach of trust can be shown only
on the part of some members but not by all, there is no ready measure to decide what proportion of faithless action should invalidate
determinations made by the whole body. Hence Justice Marshall's
ruling in Fletcher v. Peck 12 that alleged bribery of legislators does
not present a justiciable basis for invalidating a statute, stands unquestioned today. 3 More difficult-as Marshall foresaw-is the
question posed when legislators have not sought to sell their votes
for a cash price, but for political advantage or the profit of a favored, narrowly focused interest in the community. The conspicuous examples are subsidy or regulatory laws passed in response to
lobbying by economic special interest groups seeking to use the law
to gain competitive advantage in the market. Loose language in
some late nineteenth and early twentieth century judicial opinions
indicated that proving that a statute allegedly passed for public purposes, would in fact serve a particular private interest would be sufficient to invalidate the act. This was an approach dubious in
principle and impractical in operation. Much legislation which
might serve a public interest was likely also to carry special gains to
some limited interests and special burdens to others. If such a mix8. People ex rel Drake v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481 (1865); State ex rel. Elfers v. Olson,
26 Wis. 2d 442, 132 N.W.2d 526 (1965).
9. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
10. Id at 550.
11. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810).
12. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
13. Id at 131. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951); Calder v. Michigan,
218 U.S. 591, 598 (1910).
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ture were enough to condemn a law, the result would be substantially to deny the interest-balancing function which our tradition
early assigned to the legislature. Alexander Hamilton effectively
pled this case to President Washington on behalf of the Hamilton
program for funding the public debt.' 4 In the following 150 years
legislative practice implicitly ratified Hamilton's view. By mid
twentieth century the United States Supreme Court had made this
explicit doctrine: The fact that in operation a statute may concurrently work on behalf of both public and private interest does not
deny validity to it; judges will not probe to examine whether the
legislators' dominant motive is to -benefit the private interest.' 5 In
late twentieth century decisions one exception stands to this general
refusal to examine legislative motive. In the context of the fourteenth amendment's particular proscription of racially discriminatory laws, the Supreme Court has ruled that proof of such a
discriminatory purpose will upset a statute, though the act may arguably also serve some proper public interest. Even here, however,
the Court sets a substantial barrier to examining legislative motive.
It is not enough for a challenger to show that the statute may in fact
operate with disproportionate burden on a disadvantaged racial minority; the challenge must also establish a specific intent to
discriminate. 16
THE LEGISLATURE'S CONTROL OF ITS PROCEDURES
Ki/bourn v. Thompson 17 left a legacy of doubt whether the
Supreme Court might be prepared to exercise rather extensive review of the internal procedures of Congress. On a poorly defined
appeal to separation of powers principles, the Court held that a witness called before a congressional committee was legally entitled to
refuse to answer questions on matters on which Congress was not
authorized to act.'" The decision seemed to have the potential for
greater extension of judicial review because of the contemporary situation in the state. The federal constitution set out only barebones
14.
15.
Darby,
Powell

See Hurst, Alexander Hamilton, Law Maker, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 483, 526 (1978).
E.g., Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); cf. United States v.
312 U.S. 100, 115-16 (1941) (analogous ruling under commerce clause). Contrast
v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1888) (obiter, statute may be invalidated if

found enacted only under "pretense" of serving public interest).
16. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 26568 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243, 248 (1976); cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot,

364 U.S. 339 (1960) (blatant racial discrimination in apportionment).
17. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
18. Id at 199-200.
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provisions for the procedures of Congress. Moved by some notorious scandals and the increasing press of business on inexperienced
bodies, however, state constitution makers imposed a catalog of procedural limitations on state legislatures-requirements as to titles of
bills, scope of subject matter, reference to committees, rolcall votes,
and others. Through the nineteenth century state courts proved
ready to entertain challenges to the validity of state legislation based
on alleged violations of such procedural requirements. In the twentieth century state judges have shown markedly less enthusiasm for
this role, but in the earlier period their example invited comparable
expansion of federal court scrutiny of how Congress did its business.
An important pattern of development in the Supreme Court since
the 1920s has been on the whole to refuse to enlarge this aspect of
federal judicial review.' 9
The most broad reaching limit on judicial review of Congress's
procedures is one so much taken for granted that it has produced
little overt challenge to elicit direct response from the Court. Executive or administrative law making looms large in the contemporary
legal order, but it depends on statutory delegations which define the
parties and subject matter with which such agencies may deal. Doctrines of standing, justiciability, and precedent limit law making by
judges, but, in contrast to the position of common law or delegated
legislation, no formal barriers of standing limit access to Congress,
or to a state legislature. Anyone who can persuade a legislator to
introduce a bill can cause the matter of his concern to be put into
the legislative machinery. In the field of economic regulation, nineteenth and early twentieth century judicial opinions seemed to set a
limited catalog of subject matter on which legislators were authorized to act, such as for public health, morals, or safety. From Nebbia
v. New York 20 on, the Supreme Court has rejected the limited catalog, recognizing that a legislature is empowered to assess the public
interest in each situation presented to it according to the context of
that situation. 2' Moreover, the twentieth-century Court has repeatedly held that the novelty of a proposal for legislation, and particularly the fact that it will change prior common law, raises no legal
19. This pattern was set before the twentieth century in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649

(1892). The Court refused to go behind a duly enrolled act of Congress to permit showing
some procedural defect which might arguably invalidate the statute.
20. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
21. See id at 532-37. But see, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v.

United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
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bar.2 2 Not even constitutional limitations prevent bringing a matter

under legislative consideration. Legislators may vote down a proposal because they think it unconstitutional. If the measure is adopted,
a court may later hold it unconstitutional. But in the first instance
the legislature may receive and consider any introduced bill. A statute is generally presumed constitutional 23 because its passage is
taken to imply that the legislators have already appraised it in light
of their own oaths to support the constitution. To deny the legislators full prior authority to weigh any measure introduced before
them would, in effect, allow judges to enjoin legislative operations.
Contemporary decisions make it plain that this would offend separation of powers principles demarcating legislative and judicial
functions.24 The general proposition was underlined by sharp dissent in the Supreme Court to the decision which sustained the procedure set by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, requiring advance
clearance by central federal authority for the operation of election
laws of states found guilty of past racial discrimination in access to
the ballot.25
If the legislature is constitutionally empowered to consider any
matter introduced before it, it is also largely free of judicial re.straints on the manner in which it goes about its business. Since the
1920s the Supreme Court has added materially to the definition of
Congress's control of its own housekeeping. Procedural due process
does not require that legislators make special investigation of relevant facts and values before they vote on a statute; they are entitled
to act on the basis of the knowledge they bring with them when they
are elected. Prudent sponsors are likely to lay a foundation for a bill
by staff work or by hearings, against possible future challenge in
court over substantive constitutionality or interpretation. But they
are not under constitutional compulsion to do so. 26 There is no pro-

cedural due process requirement that the legislature give notice or
opportunity to be heard to those who may be affected by proposed
22. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962); Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S.
117, 122 (1929). See especially, Holmes, J., for the Court, in Noble Bank v. Haskell, 219
U.S. 104, 113 (1911).
23. See O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1931).
24. See Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 245 (1952); Rose Manor
Realty Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 272 Wis. 339, 345, 75 N.W.2d 274, 277 (1956); Goodland v.
Zimmerman, 243 Wis. 459, 466, 10 N.W.2d 180, 182 (1943).
25. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 595 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting);
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 357-61 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
26. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 190 n.13 (1968), overruled, 426 U.S. 840 (1976);
Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 451 (1937).
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legislation, however serious may be its impact. In practice contemporary legislatures are likely to provide some notice and opportunity to appear in committee hearings. But they do so wholly at their
own discretion. 27 When legislative committees hold hearings, in
most respects they have the last word on their procedures, free of
limits set for proceedings in court by constitutions or by the law of
evidence. Court-made rules of evidence do not govern; most striking, legislative hearings need not conform to rules against hearsay.
The committee's discretion governs the order in which interested
parties may produce evidence or testimony; whether affected parties
have opportunity to attempt any rebuttal or to make timely rebuttal
of adverse material is up to the committee. Committees rarely allow
affected interests to cross examine those who present hostile material; the committee alone decides whether there shall be any cross
examination. 28 Aside from some limited authority for barring invasion of rights of free speech and association protected by the first
amendment, twentieth century Supreme Court decisions have imposed no constitutional limits on the subject matter of legislative
investigations. 2 9 There is now precedent for applying to legislative
hearings the privilege against self-incrimination and constitutional
limits on search of papers, but this doctrine only narrowly qualifies
the general discretion conceded to legislative process.3 ° Overall,
modem Supreme Court doctrine has developed to show that there
are almost no judicially enforceable, constitutional limits on how
the legislature chooses the subjects to which it attends and the procedures by which it goes about its business.
In practice there are some qualifications to put on this picture
of the legislature's constitutional freedom to control its operations.
Facts limit access to the legislature, though the law does not. Affected interests are not equal in wealth or sophistication; practical
27. Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1933) (dictum). See also United States v. Florida E. Coast R.R., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (no procedural

due process requirements for notice and hearing before adoption of generalized delegated
legislation by a regulatory agency).
28. See Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 304 (1933).
29. This is contrary to the earlier intimations in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168
(1881).
30. On the broad scope of subject matter allowed for legislative investigation, see Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 291-92 (1929); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135,
173-75 (1927); cf. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1953) (narrow construction
of authority of Congressional committee investigating lobbying). On application of the privilege against self-incrimination and the fourth amendment, see Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957); cf. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S.
539 (1963) (protection of right of association).
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inequalities limit those who make themselves effectively heard in
the legislative arena. This is a reality reflected in the fact that weak
interests have sometimes obtained some satisfactions through lawsuits before they have gotten it through statutes, as happened in the
matter of racial discrimination in public schools. Thus, twentiethcentury resort to the administrative process-and judges' willingness to accept this development as lawful delegation of legislative
powers-helped answer the need to respond to interests which from
their diffuse character or want of resources could not win direct action from legislators. Moreover, legislative procedures have not
been as wholly free from restraint as modern constitutional doctrine
permits. Prudence may counsel providing special investigation and
giving some notice and opportunity to be heard as matters of legislative grace where the Court has been unwilling to find constitutional
command. 3 ' The Supreme Court has found limits on the subject
matter and procedures of legislative investigations, which the Court
will enforce in protection of witnesses.32
Nonetheless, with all qualifications imposed by practice and by
constitutional requirement, the twentieth-century Supreme Court
has on the whole kept judicial review out of the internal business of
Congress. State constitutions include more detailed constitutional
prescriptions on legislative procedure than the federal constitution
contains. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, the
record likewise shows relatively little intervention by judicial review
affecting the in-house behavior of state legislatures.
Taking together the potential range of issues with which judges
might grapple concerning either the title of the legislative branch or
its modes of procedure, we emerge with a quite restricted judicial
role. Because the drama of confrontations over the substantive
powers of legislatures has tended to pre-empt attention, realistic perspective calls for holding this aspect of our inventory of judicial review well in mind.
THE SUBSTANCE OF STATUTORY POLICY:
INTERPRETATION
No drafters, however skilled and foresighted, can anticipate the
31.

Cf Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936) (emphasis on lack of

legislative record justifying statutory classification).
32. Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749
(1962); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957).
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full extent of issues which are likely to be produced within the range
of a statutory text. Legislators tend to focus only on matters immediately pressed on them, often leaving unresolved the relation of a
particular statute to other legislation dealing with related subjects.
On occasion, political and interest-group bargaining results in a text
of some calculated ambiguities. The press of business on limited
legislative time makes for hurried work, not always finely adjusted
to the complexities of problems. Such factors mean that administrators and judges inevitably must-in the name of statutory interpretation-provide a good deal of the practical content of policy
declared in the statute books. Judges have taken the lead in formulating and legitimizing principles of construction, and in this enterprise the Supreme Court of the United States has provided
especially influential models. Thus a major dimension of judicial
review of legislative action consists in the Court's approach to the
interpretation of statutes.
This role of the Court is more relevant in appraising the division of functions between judges and legislators. Judges must determine what a statute means before they can decide whether the
legislature means to do something it may constitutionally do. This
reality is one ground of the longstanding doctrine that, when reasonably possible, judges will interpret a statute in order to avoid
presenting a serious issue of its constitutionality. It is a rule of prudence as well as of realism, reflecting judges' uneasiness over the
extent to which judicial review of a statute's constitutionality conflicts with the tradition of electing representative assemblies to be
the prime makers of public policy. The rule has taken notable
prominance in twentieth-century decisions. 33 Its prominence is consistent with rising sensitivity in the Supreme Court to the uneasy fit
between judicial review and the norms of republican, representative
government.
This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the doctrine on
statutory interpretation. I focus on two major points of comparison
between approaches typical of the nineteenth and of the twentieth
centuries, reflected in rulings of the Supreme Court. In one aspect
there is important continuity of doctrine, in another an important
shift. In both there is a common element, the extension of substan33. See, e.g., United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963); Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); United States v.
Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932).
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tial judicial judgment in providing specific content to statutory
policy.
There has been continuity in the lead the Supreme Court has
given in dealing with tension between form and substance in statutory law. A statute presents public policy in the frame of an authoritative text. Behind the text presumably is some substantive purpose.
Imperfections in communication may mean that the text sometimes
appears to point one way, while reasonable argument suggests that
in a particular situation the legislature's substantive purpose would
be fulfilled only by departing from the rigor of the formal words.
Confronted with this tension, the Supreme Court continues in the
twentieth century to assert, as it did in leading nineteenth-century
decisions, that judges are not required mechanically to bring under
the statute every situation the act's literal terms appear to govern.
Such rulings continue the assertion of an important role for the exercise ofjudicial choice in determining the particular content of statutory policy. Assertion of this judicial power is still tempered by
recognition that the statutory text-as the final, formal declaration
of the body which is normally prime maker of public policyshould operate to allocate the burden of persuasion between contending parties. If on its face the text supports the position of one
contestant, due regard to the text suggests that a substantial burden
of persuasion should rest on the opponent to prove that the statute
has a different meaning.34 To define the force of the text is not to
treat the text lightly; lawsuits are often won or lost according to allocation of the burden of persuasion. On the other hand, treating the
matter so constitutes a significant claim of judicial authority with
reference to statute law.
I have sketched this pattern of Supreme Court doctrine in
sharper lines than one finds in many opinions. But I believe that my
reading is faithful to continuing currents in the Court's behavior.
The Supreme Court's lead was not clearly followed in a good deal
of state court handling of state legislation in the nineteenth century.
The literal treatment of statutory texts in state courts, however,
seems-as in applications of the rule of strict construction of statutes
in derogation of common law-sometimes to have expressed not ju34. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978); Order of R.R.

Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. R.R., 362 U.S. 330, 335 (1960); United States v. American
Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940). The treatment of such cases follows the classic
pattern on effect of the text in allocating the burden of persuasion without assigning
mechanical force to text, set in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457
(1892).
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dicial deference to the text so much as judicial jealousy of conceding
broad scope to the legislature's policy making role. Twentieth-century state court handling of statutory interpretation appears to follow more closely the lead given by the Supreme Court in dealing
with adjustments between form and substance in statutory law.35
The striking contrast between nineteenth and twentieth century
treatment of legislation lies in the different focus in which judges
have sought to view issues under statutes. Here the twentieth-century Supreme Court has led in an approach sharply different from
the characteristic pattern set by state judges in the preceding century. In the earlier period state courts elaborated a network of rules
of statutory construction, the common feature being their abstract
quality. Thus, by the terms of the rule of strict construction of statutes in derogation of common law, it does not matter whether the
statute deals with rights in personalty or in property, with land title
or with liability for negligent behavior. If a given interpretation of
the act would change existing common law, the presumption--says
the rule-is that the legislators did not intend that result. Common
sense, however, suggests that if the legislature intervenes in an area
formerly governed by common law, it probably intervenes because
it finds the common law in some way unsatisfactory and means to
change it. In the proliferation of these rules, judges typically contrived for each rule a countervailing proposition. Thus the rule that
a remedial statute should be liberally construed to effect its beneficial object offered an offset to the derogation rule. The net result
was a diverse catalog which gave warrant to large and doctrinally
unchecked judicial discretion in dealing with legislation. This diversity of abstract rules seems often to have cloaked judges' distaste
36
for finding themselves displaced as prime policy makers.
From about the 1920s the Supreme Court gave leadership to a
quite different, more sharply focused approach to legislation. What
it did typically involved legislation by Congress. But its example
has found counterparts in main currents of state court handling of
state legislation.
In the past sixty years the Supreme Court has turned treatment
of questions of statutory interpretation away from reliance on ab35. See Jackson, J., for the Court, in Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350 (1943) (recognizes doctrine of construing act in conformity with

expressed legislative policy).
36. See R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION

AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES

206-12,

227-29 (1975); K. LLEWLLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 521-35

(1960).
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stract canons of construction to concentration on materials particular to the statute in issue. The typical approach now fulfills the
admonition of Justice Holmes in 1916, that "every question of conthat would prevail in one case
struction is unique, and an argument
37
may be inadequate in another.
The new emphasis on particulars does not ignore statutory text.
Indeed, it gives the text more careful attention, but in a way that is
not governed by highly generalized propositions about meaning.
Thus the Court looks closely at context, at the drafter's choice of
generic or specific words, or of words of specialized or of ordinary
meaning with reference to an indicated subject, and at implications
of exceptions or qualifying terms attached to the principal declaration. The Court recognizes that in the pragmatic realities of legislative process any given statute is more likely to be a product of
accretion than of single stroke, comprehensive codification of public
policy. Hence the Court is alert to guides provided by continuities
and changes in successive acts on the same subject and by provisions of acts dealing with related subject matter.38
The most dramatic demonstration of this new focus on the particular context of a statute has been the Court's increased readiness
to seek evidence of legislators' intention in the details of the legislative history of a bill. Thus the Court may compare an introduced
bill with amendments proposed and adopted or rejected or modified
in the course of passage, and may consider matter presented in hearings before legislative committees, in debate preserved in the Congressional Record, and in reports of legislative committees which
worked on the measure. 39 As of the turn of the century, the Court
sometimes spoke as if it would not allow consideration of such material extrinsic to the formal text. But steady expansion of practice
over some sixty years now has made resort to legislative history rela37. Holmes, J., for the Court, in United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 402

(1916).
38. E.g., United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 261 (1966) (ordinary meaning); Baltimore

& Ohio Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 353 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1957) (generic words); United States v.
American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 545 (1940) (statutes in pari materia); Gooch v.

United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128-29 (1936) (context, presence of exception).
39. See Long Island R.R. v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R., 439 U.S. 1, 7 (1978) (stbse-

quent amendment); Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. Federal Power Comm'n, 420 U.S. 395,
407-08 (1975) (committee report); S. & E. Contractors v. United States, 406 U.S. i, 13 n.9
(1972) (hearings); Wright v.Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 463
n.8 (1937) (debate); Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128-29 (1936) (amendment by

succeeding statute).

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:487

tively commonplace. 40 It may have become too commonplace, for
the practice presents some troubling problems of reliability and
propriety.
Let us accept as fact that behind the terms of a statute lie realities of division of labor in the legislative process. Under this division of labor the detailed content of an act is typically the product of
a few legislators, staff, and lobbyists. Ordinarily the general membership contributes chiefly the sanction of their ability by their votes
to ratify or reject or modify what these specialists do. This pattern
provides legitimate resort to legislative history created by the activity of a limited number of individuals as a basis for finding the intent of the legislature.
There are reasons to question the degree of reliance judges
should put on such evidence. Depending on the recorded circumstances, adoption, modification, or rejection of amendments may
raise substantial inferences of deliberate policy choices made, but a
bare record of amending history may reveal little. Pressures of time
or extraneous bargaining considerations rather than the merits may
determine what happens. Evidence at hearings is often to be discounted as the product of narrowly focused, selfish interests. Floor
debate may be loose and unstructured, or alternatively may be contrived to plant material to support an outcome for which votes could
not be mustered were the matter put plainly in the text of a bill.
Committee reports may be most reliable since it is typically in committee markup sessions that the detailed look is done which yields a
bill. But committee reports are often disappointingly perfunctory
paraphrases of the formal text.
In various aspects the Supreme Court's practice reflects unease
over such questions of reliability. The Court is likely to give weight
to the history of amendments in the course of passage only where
quite specific choices were presented. 4 ' Hearings evidence is likely

to be invoked to prove only general goals rather than details of proposed legislation.42 In recorded debate, remarks of members who
have a specialist relation to the bill-members of the committee reporting it, sponsors, members in charge of floor debate time-may
be given weight regarding detailed context as well as general goals.
40. Compare United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897)
with Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 463 n.8 (1937).
41. See Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936). Accord Ross v. Ebert, 275
Wis. 523, 529, 82 N.W.2d 315, 318-19 (1957).

42. See Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 57677 (1971); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 568 (1969).
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But remarks of members lacking such specialist roles are likely to be
show general agreement on the large objecconsidered only as they
43
measure.
the
of
tives
All the doubts about the reliability of using legislative history
should remind judges of the fact that the enacted text is the most
focused evidence of legislative intent, and the evidence on which
ultimate votes were cast. The Court recognizes this by its continued
insistence in formal doctrine that, prerequisite to using material
outside the text, there should be a showing that the text is of uncertain meaning. Realism calls for caution in appraising this rule. The
rule often seems to have impact by allocating a burden of persuasion. If on its face the statutory text conveys a reasonable meaning,
the Court is likely to require a party who asserts a reading different
from that apparently indicated by the text to meet a substantial burden of producing evidence and argument to sustain his position.
This approach is a considerable reinforcement of respect for the separation of policy-making functions between legislature and court.
On the other hand, the Court's general practice over the past sixty
years denies a limitation which some opinions appear to lay downthat, unless textual ambiguity exists, all evidence extrinsic to the text
is simply legally incompetent. In practice it seems plain that the
Court treats the matter as one of the credibility and not of the competence of extrinsic evidence of legislative intent. The Court seems
typically to weigh all matter and argument put to it, from both statutory text and from sources outside the text, and prefers the text
when it finds the outside evidence too thin or diverse or otherwise
unconvincing. Qualified by the use the Court makes of the text to
allocate burden of persuasion, this outcome for a credibility rather
than a competency test means that the Court asserts more discretion
in determining the detailed content of statutory law.
Increased use of legislative history also marks twentieth-century state court treatment of state statutes."4 Opportunities here are
more limited, because state legislatures typically create much less of
a printed record of the background of a statute than Congress does.
In the states the most likely kind of legislative history material available will be sequences of introduced bills, amendments in course of
43. Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976). See
generally Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 463, n.8
(1937); Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474 (1921).
44. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940); United
States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 83 (1932); Boston Sand and Gravel
Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928).
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passage, and final versions, together with such directions of policy as
may be indicated by the course of successive acts on the same subject or of legislation inparimateria.45Whether in the federal or state
domain, this evidence, by its nature brought to formal expression,
does not raise the same questions of credibility that material from
legislative hearings or debate raise. On the other hand, we should
recognize that resort even to these more reliable materials may in
practice increase the extent of policy making discretion wielded by
judges.
Both under federal and state legislation, the last sixty years
have seen increased resort to another kind of material outside the
statutory text. Not surprisingly, the rise in importance of the administrative process has brought more and more attention to action of
administrators as persuasive evidence of legislative intent. Use of
this material is especially important regarding state statutes, because
it is likely to be more available than any legislative history. Again
betraying concern lest they be found exceeding their proper sphere,
judges hedge in the use of administrative construction with an impressive catalog of qualifications. In the first place, here as with legislative history, courts say that a party who would invoke
administrative construction must first show that the statutory text is
of uncertain meaning. Then courts say that they will give weight to
administrators' practice in applying the act only if the practice is
that of officials charged with responsibility for carrying out the statutory policy, originates close to the time of enactment, is continued
for a substantial period, is consistent, and stands without disavowal
in the legislative record. Administrative construction may get positive reinforcement from later legislative history, if the legislature
fails or refuses to respond to petitions to change what the administrators have done, or by specific appropriations provides continuing
funds to sustain the administrators' activity.4 These are limiting
terms. Inherently they also leave scope for judgment in application,
and variance in the decisions makes plain that, as with use of other
extrinsic materials, resort to administrative construction enlarges judicial discretion in determining the detailed content of statute-based
law.
Apart from questions of reliability there are factors of economy
45. See, e.g., In re Shields' Adoption, 4 Wis. 2d 219, 89 N.W.2d 827 (1958); Ross v.
Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W.2d 315 (1957).
46. Alstate Constr. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13, 16-17 (1953); Norwegian Nitrogen Prod.
Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 314-15 (1933); United States v. Shreveport Grain &
Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 84 (1932).
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and fairness to be weighed in using material outside the statute
books. In the day-in, day-out press of conducting people's affairs
within the law it would be impractical to require parties to consult
legislative and administrative records before acting in reliance on
the statute book. In practice most applications of statute law or of
delegated legislation (administrative rules) are made simply on the
basis of the formal text; the economy of a workable legal order
makes this the norm. Moreover, in proportion as courts give determining weight to legislative and administrative records they create
pressure on parties to turn to those records. Resort to such extrinsic
materials spells more legal fees. The records are not available in
many depositories, so that apart from money cost there may be
problems of ready access to the material. These elements may tip
the scales in favor of a party more fortunately located or possessing
the bigger purse. These considerations of economy and fairness argue for assigning great weight to the statutory text, and give sound
policy reasons for putting a substantial burden of persuasion on the
party whose position calls for departing from a reading of the statute solidly supported by the text. The readiness with which the
Court has embraced use of legislative history and administrative
construction in the last generation suggests that judges tend to treat
these value problems too lightly.47
THE SUBSTANCE OF STATUTORY POLICY:
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Since the years of the Marshall Court the dramatic focus of
legislative-judicial relations has tended to be on judicial review of
the constitutionality of the substantive policy made by legislators.
Judicial power made itself most manifest from the late 1870s into
the 1930s, especially as the Supreme Court developed new potentials for its review role under the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment as restraints on state legislators. The years since the late 1930s, however, have witnessed an
equally marked shift of direction as the Supreme Court has sharply
reduced its reviewing activity in some spheres, sharply enlarged it in
others, altogether making a pattern substantially different from that
set in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The principal impact of judicial review has always been more
47. See Jackson, The MeaningofStatutes, 34 A.B.A. J. 535, 538 (1948); United States v.

Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); Schwegmann Bros.
v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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by enforcing constitutional limitations than by defining the extent of
constitutional grants of authority to legislators. This emphasis was
inherent in the character of state constitutions. At least in their origins, these specified curbs on power more than they conferred particular authority. By simply vesting otherwise undefined "legislative
power" in elected assemblies, state constitutions endowed state legislatures with the traditional powers of Parliament, augmented by
the prerogative powers of the Crown. Thus there was little occasion
for state judges to spell out positive grounds of state legislative
power.48 In contrast, the federal constitution gave Congress only
such authority as was contained under the heads listed in Article 1,
Section 8. That Congress needed particular warrant for what it did
was tempered by the sweep of the most important grant clauses, notably those conferring power to tax, borrow, and spend, to provide a
money supply, to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, and to
provide for the national defense. It inhered in the breadth of these
grants that they would gain detailed content from legislative and
executive practice and from decisions of the Supreme Court.4 9
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a few Supreme
Court decisions-of considerable political if not economic impactlimited the scope of Congress's power over federal territories,50 over
53
52
the money supply, 5' over interstate commerce, and over taxes.
Viewed in relation to the whole, these rulings, though important,
dealt only with limited portions of Congress's activities. For the
most part it was Congress's own practice which defined the extent of
Congress's powers. So far as the Court entered the scene-as in upholding Congress's regulation of interstate navigation in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 4 or its creation of a national bank in McCulloch v. Maryland 5 5 -its action generally validated broad authority in Congress.
The Court stirred acute controversy in the few earlier cases which
denied congressional authority. But it was the rapid course of
48. See People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46,49 (1854); People ex rel. Wood v. Draper, 15 N.Y.
532, 543 (1857); Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis. 195, 225 (1860).
49. See Gibbons v Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheaton) 1, 194-96 (1824).
50. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 Howard) 393 (1857).
51. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wallace) 603 (1870), overruled by the Legal
Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wallace) 457 (1871).
52. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1 (1895).
53. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 29 (1922); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
54. 22 U.S. (9 Wheaton) 1 (1824).
55. 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 316 (1819).
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events from 1935 to 1937 which decisively limited the Court's impact on approving Congress's authority. In quick succession a series
of decisions upset important elements of the New Deal programs
designed to combat the depression, provoking high political dispute
as well as President Roosevelt's proposal to enlarge the Court by
enough new members to assure acceptance of his measures. The
Court packing bill failed. However, following the triumphant reelection of the President and the sharpening of the issue of the legitimacy of the judicial review role, a majority of the Court validated
Congress's monetary, fiscal and commerce powers with a sweep
which in practical effect removed the Court as a material check on
Congress's definition of its power over the economy. 6
Two doctrinal developments after 1920 stand out as narrowing
the Court's review role over the scope of the constitutional power of
Congress. Federal spending has offered prime leverage for national
policy over the economy. In a measure of self restraint remarkable
for its timing, the Court in 1923 ruled that both a federal taxpayer
and a state lacked standing to challenge the validity of a federal
expenditure. 7 These decisions did not foreclose all possible resort
to the courts to challenge national spending programs. In 1936,
however, the Court in practical effect barred other avenues of attack. In calculated dictum in United States v. Butler,5 8 the Court

validated decades of congressional appropriations practice which
had followed Hamilton's reading of the Constitution: Congress's
power to appropriate federal moneys is not simply auxiliary to other
granted powers; it is an independent authority, to spend for such
programs as Congress reasonably decides will promote a national
interest. 9
A second major development in doctrine dealt with the commerce clause. Upholding a broad sweep of national regulation of
56. R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 169, 174-79 (1960). See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 301 U.S. 379 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937).
57. Massachusetts v. Mellon, and Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Cf
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (tacit acceptance of standing of corporate stockholder in suit to enjoin corporation's compliance with federal tax).
58. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
59. Id at 64-67. See Hurts, Alexander Hamilton, Law Maker, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 483,
494 (1978). The practical impact of the Court's attitude reflected in the Butler dictum is
reinforced by the fact that the Court silently ignored the standing problem of Frothingham
in sustaining a federal tax against a taxpayer's challenge in Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548 (1937).
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labor relations and of agricultural production, the Court sanctioned
Congress's power under the commerce clause to regulate activity in
production or distribution which Congress determined to have material effects on interstate commerce either through particular impacts or by the aggregate impacts of the regulated activity.
Moreover, the Court's expanded reading of congressional power
amounted to rejecting the tenth amendment as an independent limitation on use of national legislative authority. Marshall had early
declared that where the Constitution gave Congress legislative authority, each grant must be taken to the "plenary," not to be restrained because of side effects on areas of policy otherwise open to
state regulation. The Court's rulings of mid twentieth century now
brought out the full meaning of Marshall's pronouncement, relegating to an historical lumberyard the strong tenth amendment bias
displayed in the E C Knight6 0 case and in Hammer v. Dagenhart.6"

There seems no basic change of direction intended by the 1976 ruling in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery,62 which held invalid legis-

lation which applied the national Fair Labor Standards Act to
municipal employees who rendered key, traditional public services
as fire and police protection. National League of Cities seems

sharply limited by its facts, carrying no indication that it will revive
any general tenth amendment check on national programs directed
at the private economy.
The principal exertions of judicial review---certainly those
which evoked the most attention-between the 1870s and the early
1930s dealt not with constitutional grants but with constitutional
limits on legislative power. The Supreme Court's actions in 1923
and 1936-1937 largely removed the tenth amendment as an independent limitation on congressional power to affect allocation of
economic resources through public fiscal authority or to affect national regulation of the private economy. But under the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, in the
span from the late 1870s through the early 1930s, the Supreme
Court asserted broad power to hold invalid substantive policy made
by state legislatures regulating marketplace behavior. And in the
60. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
61. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Eg., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (federal regula-

tion affecting agricultural production); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301
U.S. 58 (1937) (federal regulation of labor relations in relatively small business firms). Cf.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheaton) 1, 197 (1824) ("plenary" nature of Congress's commerce power).
62. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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early twentieth century the Court also found implicit in the fifth
amendment a standard of equal protection as well as of due process
binding the substantive policy making of Congress.6 3 We should
not exaggerate the negative impact of judicial review in these areas
of constitutional limitations. By one count, in 197 cases between
1899 and 1937 the Supreme Court invalidated state or federal laws
under the standard of substantive due process. Another estimate
notes that between 1889 and 1918 the Court upheld 369 challenged
statutes enacted under state "police power." Other tallies emphasize
the more vigorous use of the judicial veto in the later years of the
forty-year span; one count finds fifty-three state police power acts
invalidated between 1889 and 1918, while another shows almost 140
laws held unconstitutional between 1920 and 19 3 0 .64 However, we
must keep the judicial vetoes in proper perspective; a great bulk of
economic regulatory legislation never came under constitutional
challenge in litigation.
Granted this last caution, the years from 1870 to 1930 saw development of a daunting catalog of constitutional limitations created by judicial fiat with scant justification in any other grounds of
constitutional history. The Supreme Court was particularly concerned with protecting relatively large autonomy of action for the
private market. To this end it spun out four lines of related limiting
doctrine. First, it identified freedom of private contract as a key
component of the "liberty" protected by the Court-made standards
of substantive due process and equal protection. This doctrine climaxed in the pronouncement in Adkins v. Children's Hospital65 in
1923-in odd juxtaposition to the 1923 rulings which denied standing to state or federal taxpayers to challenge federal spending-that
freedom of contract was so far a constitutionally preferred value
that a litigant relying on any statute limiting freedom of contract
carried a heavy burden of persuasion to justify what the legislature
had enacted. Second, the Court found warrant in the standard of
substantive due process for holding legislatures to pursuit of a limited number of public-interest goals. It spoke often of legislative
authority as the sum of a limited, closed catalog of purposes traditionally recognized as serving public interest---commonly, the protection of health, safety or morals. The force of these decisions was
that a statute violated substantive due process if its objective did not
63. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

64. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
65. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

435 (1978).
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fit readily under one of those familiar designations of public purpose.66 Of special importance in this respect were rulings which limited statutory regulation of prices and services of private contractors
to what judges regarded as businesses "affected with a public interest"-those conventionally deemed public utilities.67 Third, substantive due process demanded that legislation serve what the Court
regarded as the general welfare. Though a statute might appear to
serve such a public goal as protection of health, it became suspect if
it appeared that it also served a specialized private interest in a way
different than might result from bargaining simply within the frame
of the common law of contract or property. Judges would accept
statutes that protected groups commonly recognized as subject to
exceptional danger or weakness in bargaining power; thus the
Supreme Court sustained a statutory limit on hours of miners working underground, and upheld a statutory limit on hours of work for
women.68 When a statute apparently sought to offset the weak bargaining power of workers in situations not conventionally tagged as
deserving the law's special care, however, the fact that the statute
would confer particular benefit on labor was sometimes deemed to
show a lack of justifying public interest. 69 Fourth, the Court usually
required a positive showing of a "real and substantial" relation between the legislature's goal and the means it provided to reach the
goal. That the Court could conceive of other, less burdensome
means of achieving the desired result was likely to be treated as a
sufficient basis for invalidating the statute.70
In a sharp turn of direction, beginning in the late 1930s, the
Supreme Court disavowed the terms on which it had set out these
four doctrines of judicial review. In United States v. Carolene Products Co. 7 the Court showed that no particular constitutional sanctity attached to the "liberty" interests involved in private contract
activity; all regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
66. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923); Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). Illustrative of the general formula is the opinion of
Harlan, J., for the Court, in Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 683 (1888), and the dissent
of Field, J., id at 695.
67. Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
68. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (women); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366

(1898) (miners).
69. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
70. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936), in substance overruled
by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). West Coast Hotel also expressly
overruled Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). See also Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
71. 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
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transactions enjoys the benefit of a presumption of constitutionality.
More specifically, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish72 the Court
had already expressly overruled Adkins v. Children'sHospital,73 and
had held that the fact that a statute limited freedom of contract did
not put a burden of justification on the supporter of the statute. Second, in Nebbia v. New York 74 the Court explicitly rejected the idea
that there was some closed catalog of permissible objectives which
legislatures might pursue. Nebbia held that a legislature might regulate business pricing practices outside the field of traditional public
utilities, if legislators could reasonably find that regulation would
serve some public interest. More broadly, the Nebbia opinion declared that though a statute intervenes in private market activity for
a purpose not within familiar concerns of public health, safety, or
morals, it is valid unless judges can determine that no reasonable
legislators could find a public-interest justification for it.75 Third,
the Court made plain that a statute is not invalid merely because in
serving some public interest it may operate concurrently to provide
special gain to some private interest. In this sense judges were not to
examine legislative "motive" as a basis for invalidating legislation.76
This seems appropriate. In this society of diverse, interweaving
interests, concurrence of public and private gain from legislation is
so common that judges materially abrogate the legislative function
if they hold that such parallel effects alone make a statute unconstitutional. Finally, implicit in these three restrictions of judicial review has been strong application of the presumption of
constitutionality on the question whether in marketplace regulation
there is a substantial relation between the legislature's objective and
the means it provides to reach the objective. It is now clear that the
legislature enjoys a broad discretion in choosing points and instruments of intervention in regulating the economy.77
In the late 1930s the course of judicial review showed two
sharply divergent currents. On the one hand the Court substantially
withdrew from measuring the constitutionality of legislation regulating activity in private markets against the standards of substan72.
73.
74.
75.

300 U.S. 379 (1937).
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934).
Id at 537.

76. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co.,

336 U.S. 220 (1949); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
77. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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tive due process and equal protection. In contrast, the Court
enlarged and tightened its scrutiny of legislation regarding constitutionally preferred values in areas of policy other than the marketplace. In these areas the Court did not accord statutes the benefit of
the general presumption of constitutionality, but instead-in somewhat varying degree according to category-put on the supporter of
a challenged statute some burden of making a positive case on behalf of the act. It took the Court from Marshall's day into the 1930s
to develop a fairly full pattern of what the presumption of constitutionality means to the moves and countermoves of lawyers and the
analysis of judges in dealing with the validity of legislation. Since
the Court began to elaborate preferred-values analysis only from the
late 1930s it is not surprising that by the 1980s the Court has yet to
achieve a consistent, detailed model.
Between 1939 and 1982 five main categories of preferred values
have emerged, progressing from quite specific to quite indefinite
boundaries. In all these categories the supporter of a statute must
satisfy some substantial burden of persuasion to uphold challenged
legislation. These categories concern (1) statutes which make race
(or ethnic, alien, or religious origin) a criterion for determining the
legal status of individuals or groups to the detriment of those historically disadvantaged on these grounds;78 (2) state statutes which appear explicitly or in demonstrated practical effect to discriminate
against interstate commerce;7 9 (3) statutes which impede rational
processes for shaping public policy, by limiting the right to vote,
defining congressional districts of unequal numbers of voters, or
limiting freedom of speech, assembly, or press relevant to public
policy making; 0 (4) statutes which burden process of public communication outside the domain of public affairs, through the arts or
through the press as these media address non-political matters;"'
and (5) statutes which in the Court's judgment deny the essential
worth or dignity of individuals by intruding on areas of life which
men and women value as private and not of public concern; those
involving freedom of religion, the internal affairs of the family,
78. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
79. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
80. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (vote); Mills v. Alabama,

384 U.S. 214 (1966) (press); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (Congressional apportionment); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (pamphleteering).
81. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial advertising); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495

(1952) (arts).
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child bearing, and private pursuit of sex experience.8 2
Under doctrines developed in the past forty years, if one challenging a statute shows that by its explicit terms the act trespasses on
a constitutionally preferred value or uses means inconsistent with
that value the burden of justification is placed on the supporter of
the statute. An example would be making the race of an accused a
constituent element of the crime.8 3 The matter is not as plain when
the statute is not suspect on its face, but the challenger claims that its
operating effect will burden a preferred value. If the challenger convinces the court that the statute's only predictable result will be such
an invasion, he will have done enough to shift to the supporter a
substantial burden of justification. If the statute may fairly be appraised as serving some valid public purpose, but the challenger
presents persuasive evidence that in operation it will also have a
disproportionately adverse effect on a specially favored constitutional value, the challenger may put on the supporter the burden of
making a strong case that a legitimate goal may be served. If the
supporter can meet that test, the Court will apparently reject the
attack unless the challenger can prove actual legislative intent to invade the specially protected value, such as proof of actual intent to
discriminate against a racially identified group. 4
Some preferred constitutional values claim more deference
than others, as measured by different levels of burden of justification that the Court now places on the supporter of a challenged statute. At the highest level of constitutional preference stand claims
for racial equality under law and for free speech and kindred communications activities relevant to rational processes of making public policy. Where the statute invidiously makes race the criterion of
its application, the legislation "even though enacted pursuant to a
valid state interest, bears a heavy burden of justification. . . .and
will be upheld only if it is necessary, and not merely rationally related to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy." 5 A statute which limits free speech in domains of public affairs or limits
82. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (child bearing); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 P.S. 438
(1972) (sex experience); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (husband-wife privacy); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (religious freedom).
83. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). Cf.Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336

U.S. 525 (1949) (explicit state discrimination against interstate commerce).
84. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Cf.Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520
(1959); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (shift of burden of persua-

sion on showing of implicit disproportionate burden on interstate commerce).
85. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
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political participation must pass "exacting scrutiny" by the Court;
its supporter must show a "compelling" justification. 6 A showing
of "necessity" or "compelling" justification seems usually to mean a
showing by the supporter that there is no reasonable alternative way
to achieve a legitimate public interest goal advanced in support of
the act. 7 Other constitutionally preferred values apparently do not
call for so strong a showing by the proponent of a challenged statute. When the regulation deals with speech not in a political context, but in commercial advertising, the supporter is under a burden
of justification, but he need only show that the act involves a substantial public-interest goal, has a substantial relation to that goal,
and is no broader than needed to serve the objective.88 A like requirement-less exacting than the "compelling justification" test-is
imposed on a supporter of a statutory classification according to
gender.89
The range of ends and means questions and responses involved
in the past forty years' elaboration of preferred-value categories
raises afresh issues of the legitimacy of judicial review. The country's constitutional history provides some substantial and quite specific warrants for strict judicial scrutiny against racial discrimination
by law and against state legislation which discriminates against interstate commerce. Though there is no such specific historical base,
there is persuasive logic for denying a presumption of constitutionality to laws which burden rational, representative processes of making law. The existence of such processes is a presupposition to the
ordinary presumption of constitutionality. A statute which strikes at
that base may well be deemed suspect. It may be more arguable to
apply strict judicial scrutiny to legislation which limits communication in the arts or in the market. However, special protection to
communications processes outside the arena of public affairs may be
justified by concern that if judges are lenient toward encroaching
laws in these non-political fields, the leniency may encourage spill86. First Nat'l Bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 31 (1968); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).

87. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977)
(discrimination against interstate commerce); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)

-(-pamphleteering).
88. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976).
89. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979), af'd, 443 U.S. 901 (1979); Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (majority), 286 (dissent) (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976).
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over of legislative restrictions into such public policy process realms
as access to the vote and political free speech.
More troublesome to those concerned about claims on behalf of
judicial as compared with legislative policy making discretion are
the decisions of the last forty years which enlarge judicial review on
behalf of values of individual worth and dignity. Such are decisions
which deal with statutes affecting child bearing, or sexual experience
or the relative social position of men and women. Arguably, strict
judicial scrutiny should apply here because such situations offer variants of threats, more overtly visible in the political arena, to interests which are disadvantaged because they lack equal access to
processes of making public policy.90 Given their proportion in the
population, however, and with the guaranty of the nineteenth
amendment, women seem not readily classified as a politically disadvantaged minority. By its own definition special constitutional
concern for protecting individual privacy in choices about child
bearing or sexual activity does not seem warranted by the concern
of protecting public policy making processes. Argument might be
made that such protection of privacy is another form of protection
for politically disadvantaged minorities. The plea would be that the
individual who confronts social conventions translated into law is
likely to be at a hopeless political disadvantage unless strict judicial
scrutiny of such regulatory laws somewhat redresses the imbalance.
But this argument proves too much. In a society as marked as ours
by the influence of public policy of organized groups, the argument
would support wholesale rejection of the presumption of constitutionality. Most legislation reflects some collective pressure on individuals or small groups. Indeed, no area of policy is more marked
by legislative victories of organized pressure over individuals or particular groups than legal regulation of the private market. Yet it is
precisely in the broad field of legal regulation of the market that
contemporary doctrine of the Court most vigorously applies the presumption of constitutionality. 9
Much in the country's constitutional and political history
teaches that law should respect the intrinsic dignity and worth of
individuals. Yet it has never proved easy to secure firm agreement
on what elements are essential to that valued individuality. When
we enlarge judicial review to protect preferred values of individuality, we need to calculate how far we are willing to accept the fact
90. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
91. See supra note 62.
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that through this avenue a few judges, under no direct political accountability to the community, may impose upon it their personal
ideas and rankings of values. The extent of judicial discretion involved is underlined by comparing two lines of decisions affecting
individual values outside the context of the market. Rejecting the
presumption of constitutionality, the Court has required that the
supporter show compelling justification for some statutes punishing
abortion or use of contraceptives. Court majorities have viewed the
individual's opportunity of choice in bearing children as an essential
element of protected privacy.92 But the Court continues to apply the
presumption of constitutionality on behalf of legislation which allocates tax derived moneys or other publicly owned economic assets.
It has done so in favor of an appropriations act which denies public
funds to pay for abortions desired by poor women. 93 It has done so
in favor of a statute which limits public welfare money provided for
poor families with children, refusing to add funds for families with
children above a statutory ceiling.94 It has done so in upholding
against a fourteenth amendment challenge the broad discretion enjoyed by a state legislature in fixing the public funds to be available
to support public schools. 95 In powerful dissents Justice Thurgood
Marshall has argued that these cases should fall within the preferred-values area. To him, as much as in the abortion and contraceptive cases, basic human rights are at stake when law affects
access to money which will allow poor women to choose whether to
bear a child, which will provide food, clothing and shelter needed to
sustain life, or which will give access to schooling which individuals
need in the political process or in the job market. 96 Whether or not
one agrees with him on extending strict judicial scrutiny to public
spending programs in these fields, his argument throws into sharp
relief the extent of policy making discretion inherent in what the
Court has been doing. Here Court majorities in effect have been
choosing to hedge from more direct involvement in issues over the
distribution of wealth and income, however great the impact on the
92. On abortion: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56, 163 (1973). On contraceptives:
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86
(1965).
93. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977).
94. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
95. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23, 28, 43 (1973).
96. See Marshall, J., dissenting, in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 457, 458 (1977); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 522 (1970).
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quality of individual life. 97
I return to the matter of proper perspective on relations of judicial review to legislative power. The Court's preferred-values analysis of the last forty years emphasizes choices important both to open
political processes and to protect values of individuality. But the
prominence of these developments should not lead us to exaggerate
the judge's role. Judges have not been the only officials who have
acted on behalf of these preferred values. Slow and unwieldy as it
has been, the legislative process has also contributed, as it has done
in laws increasing access to public records, regulating use of money
in politics, and enlarging legal protection of civil rights. Moreover,
the presumption of constitutionality continues to provide the frame
within which the Supreme Court says we should appraise the validity of the great bulk of legislation. Though they deal with important
matters, preferred-value categories, old and new, apply to only a
small part of the whole body of statutory law. Finally, we should
recognize that the drama of courtroom confrontations invites us to
exaggerate their relative place in the operations of the legal order as
a whole. Most statutory law, and most of the administrative rules
which exist within statutory delegations, never come into any constitutional litigation. This is true of the great range of legislation and
delegated legislation which lays taxes, appropriates and dispenses
public moneys to provide services as well as to support regulation,
regulates marketplace behavior, protects public health and safety,
sets legal terms for existence of corporations, and deals with many
other matters deemed of some public concern. Viewed in this perspective, the values to which the Court has been assigning constitutionally preferred status are in play only in quite limited sectors of
the whole legal order. However active they have been, judges still
97. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471, 479 (1977) and the dissent of Harlan, J., in

Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361-62 (1963). The extent of policy discretion exercised
in elaborating preferred-value doctrine is also reflected in exchanges in Carey v. Population
Serv. Int'l, among the plurality, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5, and 693 n.15 (1977), and Powell, J.,
concurring, id at 705, and Rehnquist, J., dissenting, id at 718. See a somewhat similar

exchange between the majority and Rehnquist, J., dissenting (joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart
and Blackmun, J.J.) in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767, 769, 772, 781, 784 (1977). The

Court has upheld judgments or decrees which require spending public money to bring matters into compliance with court orders. Eg., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). But such decisions probably reflect concern

for the efficacy and status of judicial judgments; they do not focus on the legislature's general control of the public purse or point to such broad judicial scrutiny of the purse power as
would be indicated if the Court ruled generally that differential impact of law on individuals
of less means in itself puts the validity of law in question.
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are a long way from monopolizing the determination of public
policy.

